Another common technique to cancel a recording contract is the use of California Civil Code Section 2855, the so called "Seven-Year Statute". According to this statute, "a contract to render personal service...may not be enforced against the employee beyond seven years from the commencement of service under it." Hence, the Seven-Year Statute prevents a record contract from being enforceable against an artist for longer than seven years.
In general, most recording agreements run for a period of one year, followed by at least four one year optional periods (the "term"). Often, the periods are contingent upon delivery of recorded product. In other words, instead of providing that a period of the agreement will be one year, the term provision may read that a period will last, for example, "one year, or a period of eight months after delivery of a specific number of recordings, whichever is later." A term based on delivery would be open-ended, because the period is dependent upon an unknown future date when the recordings are actually delivered. However, because of Section 2855, few artist contracts are written for a period of more than seven years.
Furthermore, under Section 2855, any employee (i.e. artist) who is a party to a contract to render personal service in the production of phonorecords may not invoke the code as a means of departure until the employee first gives "written notice to the employer... specifying that the employee from and after a future date certain specified in the notice will no longer render service under the contract" by reason of the expiration of the seven year time limit.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Section 2855 does allow for a record company to sue an artist for monetary damages if, after seven years, the artist terminates the contract and signs with a new company but still owes the first company one or more records. Obviously, however, since the music industry is generally unpredictable with respect to sales, such damages would be speculative.
Interestingly Ms Braxton [discussed last time], who signed her first recording agreement in August 1989, initially utilized Section 2855 when - prior to her bankruptcy petition - she filed a suit against LaFace in the Los Angeles Superior Court on the basis that her agreement became invalid in August 1996. Apparently, before the civil action was filed she had held discussions with her label about adjusting the terms of the contract, but the talks had reached an impasse. (Again, it would appear that the filing of the Section 2855 action was a negotiating ploy.) LaFace countersued Braxton for breach of contract and then Braxton filed the bankruptcy action which put a stay on the lawsuits.
In the same fashion as Braxton, other high profile artists have used Section 2855 as a lever in the renegotiation of - or exit from - an existing agreement. In 1992, recording star Luther Vandross filed a suit against Epic Records in Los Angeles Superior Court claiming he was no longer bound to his 1981 contract. The very next year, former Eagle Don Henley became embroiled in a Los Angeles Superior Court action with his label, Geffen Records, wherein Henley sought to terminate his 1984 contract. Thereafter, in 1994, Henley's Eagle brethren Glenn Frey was involved in a similar lawsuit when MCA Records sued Frey after he attempted to end his deal. In that same year, the band Metallica challenged its contact with Elektra Records when it asked the court to dismiss the band from its contract. In 1997 the Smashing Pumpkins notified Virgin Records that it would not render future services to the label under the contract it signed in 1991. These disputes have all been settled out of court, and thus the judiciary has not had a chance to rule on the implications of Section 2855.
Equally important, the Vandross, Henley and Frey cases involved an interesting issue that was not adjudicated because of the settlements, but which might impact the outcome of such a situation if it went to trial. In these three matters, although the original contracts between the artist and label were more than seven years old when the artist attempted to leave the deal, there had been subsequent amendments made to the contracts, and the amendments were not seven years old. Hence, the labels argued that the amendments counted as new contracts. Fortunately, on this point there is some guidance. In a New York case involving singer Melissa Manchester and her record company Arista, the court held that an amendment to a contract can stop the seven year clock (or start it anew) if the amendment is so all- encompassing as to amount to a new contract, and if the artist freely elected to extend the term from an equal bargaining position. The amendment issue notwithstanding, Section 2855 is the device most commonly introduced by a disgruntled artist when seven years has elapsed since the date of contract execution.
[part 3 next time]
Ben McLane Esq